Success stories often have a darker side and, in the case of China’s growth miracle, this lies in the size of the debt burden of its municipalities. Official estimates, which are disputed, show this figure to have trebled since 2007. In 2010, it reached Rmb14,000bn ($2,194bn), or 35 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

　　成功的背后常常伴有陰影，就中國而言，在它經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的奇跡背后，巨額地方債的陰影揮之不去。據(jù)官方估計，中國的地方債規(guī)模自2007年至今已上漲兩倍，對這個數(shù)字人們?nèi)杂袪幾h。2010年，中國的地方債達(dá)到14萬億元人民幣（合2.194萬億美元），占中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的35%。

　　One reason the estimates are so uncertain is that local authorities were never supposed to borrow in the first place. In spite of an official ban, however, Beijing tacitly allowed them to borrow money from banks by setting up so-called local government financing vehicles. Much of this debt is poorly collateralised, some of it backed by land whose high value risks plummeting in the event of a slowdown. Other loans have been invested in unproductive assets, which are unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to repay them.

　　估算結(jié)果之所以帶有如此大的不確定性，原因之一是中國地方政府本來就無權(quán)借債。然而，盡管官方明令禁止，但對于地方政府通過所謂的地方政府融資平臺從銀行貸款的行為，中國中央政府卻予以默許。大部分地方債的擔(dān)保情況糟糕：有些債務(wù)由土地?fù)?dān)保，而一旦經(jīng)濟(jì)增長減速，目前土地高昂的價值便可能嚴(yán)重縮水；其他一些債務(wù)用于投資購買非生產(chǎn)性資產(chǎn)，這些資產(chǎn)不大可能產(chǎn)生足夠的收入來償還債務(wù)。

　　In order to deal with this problem, Beijing is proposing to allow a limited number of local authorities to issue bonds directly for the first time since 1994. This is a significant development and a welcome one. It should oblige local governments to be more transparent about their finances. Hopefully, this will in turn lead to a more disciplined approach to borrowing money. Greater disclosure will allow investors to differentiate between those municipalities which run a tight ship and those that are profligate. This should encourage them to cut borrowings and make better use of the funds which they receive.

　　為了解決這個問題，中國中央政府提出允許有限數(shù)量的地方政府直接發(fā)債，這是自1994年以來的第一次。這個轉(zhuǎn)變令人矚目，也受到歡迎。這應(yīng)當(dāng)能迫使地方政府在財政方面更加透明化，反過來這也有望規(guī)范它們的貸款行為。加大信息披露力度，將使投資者可以區(qū)分哪些地方政府量入為出、哪些肆意揮霍。這應(yīng)該會促使地方政府削減債務(wù)，并更好地利用籌得的資金。

　　Both are essential tasks. After all, it seems unlikely that Beijing has liberalised because it sees ideological merit in financial devolution. Rather, it is probably doing so because it is worried about the financial pickle local authorities have got themselves into. Some independent estimates show that the municipal debt burden may be as high as Rmb20,100bn.

　　這兩個任務(wù)都非常重要。畢竟，中國中央政府放開地方債發(fā)行，似乎不大可能是因為看到財政權(quán)下放在意識形態(tài)上的優(yōu)點，它這樣做，大概是出于對地方政府所處財政困境的擔(dān)心。據(jù)一些獨立機(jī)構(gòu)估算，地方債規(guī)模可能高達(dá)20.1萬億元人民幣。

　　Given the seriousness of the problem, the Chinese government should perhaps worry about whether anyone will buy municipal bonds. Over the summer, the Ministry of Finance, has struggled to sell bonds on behalf of local authorities. Unless fiscal discipline is restored, direct sales of municipal paper will be no easier.

　　鑒于地方債問題的嚴(yán)重性，中國政府或許應(yīng)該擔(dān)心一個問題：這些地方政府債券會不會有人買。整個夏天，財政部(The Ministry of Finance)一直在努力出售代表地方政府發(fā)行的債券，但賣得并不好。除非財政自律得到恢復(fù)，地方政府直接發(fā)行的債券也不會好賣。

　　One solution is for Beijing to assure that it will bail out local authorities in the event of default, which will in turn require closer monitoring of their spending. This may put central government on the hook for a lot of unwanted liabilities. But it is probably the best way to solve what is a growing local finance headache.

　　解決這個問題的方法之一，是由中央政府提供擔(dān)保，保證在地方政府違約的時候，中央政府會出手紓困。反過來，這將要求中央政府更嚴(yán)密地監(jiān)控地方政府的支出情況。這也許會令中央政府對許多它不愿意背負(fù)的債務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)。但要解決越來越令人頭疼的地方財政難題，這也許是最好的辦法。