We know what the west wants from a resurgent China. We have a pretty good sense of what China doesn’t want from the west. What’s missing from this story of global geopolitical upheaval is a clear idea of what China wants from its rise to great power status.

　　我們很清楚西方希望從一個東山再起的中國身上得到些什么，也相當(dāng)了解中國不希望從西方那里得到些什么。但在當(dāng)前這場全球地緣政治巨變中，我們所不清楚的是，中國希望從崛起為世界強國的過程中得到些什么。

　　Like many European and American commentators I spend a fair amount of time listening to Chinese scholars, officials and diplomats. A few years ago such figures were a rare sighting on the international conference circuit. And visitors to Beijing were left feeling that their interlocutors had been carefully screened to admit only one view of the world.

　　與許多歐美評論人士一樣，我花了大量時間傾聽中國學(xué)者、官員和外交家的講話。就在幾年前，這些人物在國際會議圈中還是一道罕見的風(fēng)景；而訪問北京的人士都會有這樣一種感覺，即與他們對話的人都是經(jīng)過精心篩選的——這些人只認(rèn)可一種世界觀。

　　Not any more. Some months ago I listened to a Chinese vice minister casually acknowledge divisions at the illustrious Central Party School about relations with Washington. Some among the keepers of the ideological flame thought the US would only ever understand the currency of raw power; others that China’s self-interest still lay in co-operation as well as competition.

　　這種情況已一去不復(fù)返。幾個月前，我聽到中國一位副部長不經(jīng)意間承認(rèn)，大名鼎鼎的中央黨校內(nèi)部在中美關(guān)系問題上存在分歧：一些固守意識形態(tài)的人認(rèn)為，美國從來都只認(rèn)硬實力這種“通貨”；也有人認(rèn)為，為確保中國自身利益，仍需采取合作與競爭雙管齊下的戰(zhàn)略。

　　Chinese academics speak quite openly, albeit off-the-record, about the conflicting currents in Beijing – between nationalists and liberals, generals and party leaders. The implications of the coming generational change at the top of the party are keenly debated.

　　對于中央高層——民族主義者與自由主義者、軍隊將領(lǐng)與黨內(nèi)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之間——在思路上存在分歧一事，中國的學(xué)者們算得上是直言不諱，盡管他們只是在私下里發(fā)表言論。目前，各界正就即將到來的中共最高層換屆會帶來哪些影響進(jìn)行著激烈辯論。

　　One leading scholar was heard to say recently that Hu Jintao, who steps down next year as China’s president, had been little more than a “petty bureaucrat”. The west was in for a surprise when the generation of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping took office. These young leaders had been shaped and hardened by Mao’s Cultural Revolution. They would not be shy of wielding power.

　　一位知名學(xué)者不久前說過，將于明年卸下國家主席一職的胡錦濤，在位時的表現(xiàn)與一位“謹(jǐn)小慎微的官僚”無異。當(dāng)待任國家主席習(xí)近平等新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上臺后，西方定會大吃一驚。毛澤東發(fā)動的文化大革命對這代年輕的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人影響很大，磨練了他們的意志。他們將不懼運用權(quán)力。

　　Others are not so sure. One prominent (and very rich) business leader argues that the grinding process of getting to top in the Chinese system militates still against a radical break with the past. What’s clear from most such conversations, though, is that Deng Xaoping’s admonition that China should hide its strength is nowadays observed more in the breach than the observance. Talk that China wants to take back charge of its East Asian neighbourhood is no longer met with protestations about a misreading of more benign intentions.

　　其他人就不那么肯定了。一位著名（且極其富有）的商界領(lǐng)袖表示，爬到體制內(nèi)的頂端意味著要被磨去棱角，這一過程仍可防止新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層徹底拋棄以往的政策。不過，此類談話大多表明了一點：人們?nèi)缃裾J(rèn)為，中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層對鄧小平關(guān)于中國應(yīng)韜光養(yǎng)晦的訓(xùn)誡，已是違背多于遵守。有關(guān)中國希望重新掌控東亞地區(qū)的言論，也不再遭到中方抗議、稱之是對自己善意的一種誤讀。

　　The west, which, absent a coherent European policy towards the rising powers, mostly means the US and Japan, is pretty clear what it wants from the new China. It was summed up in the worn, but still useful, phrase coined by Robert Zoellick, when he called for Beijing to behave as a “responsible stakeholder”.

　　西方非常清楚自己希望從面貌一新的中國那里得到些什么——鑒于歐洲對新興大國缺乏一致的政策，這里的西方主要指美國和日本。對于這一點，可以用羅伯特?佐利克(Robert Zoellick)創(chuàng)造的一個陳腐但仍然有用的說法來概括：他呼吁中國政府成為一個“負(fù)責(zé)任的利益攸關(guān)方”。

　　This sees China taking its place in defending and developing the rules-based global order. Beijing has a point when it protests this is a western construction. Yet the US can argue that it has provided the essential framework for China’s rise.

　　這將要求中國擔(dān)負(fù)起自己的責(zé)任，捍衛(wèi)并發(fā)展基于規(guī)則的全球秩序。中國政府抗議這是西方構(gòu)筑的秩序——它這么說有一定道理。但美國可以主張，這一秩序為中國的崛起提供了不可或缺的框架。

　　On the other side of the fence, Chinese policymakers make few bones about what they don’t want from the west. Top of the list is any hint of a challenge to China’s territorial integrity. Support for more autonomy in Tibet or Xinjiang or for Taiwanese independence is a hostile act – an effort to foment the break-up of the Chinese state.

　　另一方面，中國政策制定者直言不諱地說出了他們不希望從西方得到些什么。中國最不想看到的是中國的領(lǐng)土完整受到任何挑戰(zhàn)。任何支持西藏或新疆獲得更多自治權(quán)、或支持臺灣獨立的行為，都被視為企圖促成中國分裂的敵對行為。

　　Second on the don’t-want list is a confrontation that would disturb the course of China’s rising prosperity. As much as it is now more assertive than Mr Deng might have liked, Beijing is anxious to avoid any rupture abroad that might jeopardise growth and social order at home. China will retaliate against, say, US arms sales to Taiwan, but within carefully-calibrated bounds.

　　中國第二不想看到的，是會擾亂中國繁榮進(jìn)程的對抗。鑒于目前中國已變得比鄧小平可能希望見到的更加自信，中國政府急于避免任何可能危及國內(nèi)增長和社會秩序的對外關(guān)系破裂。比方說，雖然中國將就美國對臺軍售報復(fù)美方，但報復(fù)措施都限定在經(jīng)過仔細(xì)拿捏的范圍內(nèi)。

　　A third taboo is western lecturing about China’s political and social order. David Cameron was reminded of this this week when he received Wen Jiabao in 10 Downing Street. The British prime minister got a public dressing down from the Chinese premier. China had had enough of British “finger-pointing” about human rights.

　　第三個禁忌是西方對中國政治和社會秩序進(jìn)行說教。英國首相戴維?卡梅倫(David Cameron)此次在唐寧街10號接見中國總理溫家寶時，就受到了提醒。溫家寶公開指責(zé)了卡梅倫的言論，暗示中國受夠了英國在人權(quán)問題上指手劃腳。

　　The snub was calculated. Accompanying officials let it be known that Mr Wen’s subsequent stopover in Berlin was much the more important leg of his European trip. This was partly, of course, because of the much more valuable trade and investment relationship between Germany and China. But Angela Merkel, it seems, is also careful to make rather less of a public fuss about dissidents.

　　這種冷落是精心設(shè)計的。隨同出訪的中國官員們放風(fēng)說，溫家寶的下一站訪問地柏林，是他此次歐洲之旅中更加重要的一站。當(dāng)然，這在一定程度上是因為中德之間的貿(mào)易和投資關(guān)系要重要得多。但另一個原因似乎是，德國總理安格拉?默克爾(Angela Merkel)小心翼翼地采取了一種不那么公開的方式，就中國異見人士問題向中方表達(dá)了不滿。

　　Beijing does not want to see any extension of intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. If China joins in telling others how to behave, others will claim legitimacy in telling it how to behave. Liberal internationalism also makes it harder for Beijing to strike dodgy deals with dubious regimes producing vital natural resources.

　　中國政府不希望看到干涉主權(quán)國家事務(wù)的做法呈現(xiàn)擴(kuò)大化。如果中國也像有關(guān)國家一樣、開始對他國的行事方式指指點點，那么別的國家會認(rèn)為自己也有理由告訴中國該如何行事。另外，自由國際主義也會讓中國政府在與關(guān)鍵自然資源出產(chǎn)國的不可靠政權(quán)達(dá)成貓膩重重的協(xié)議時，面臨更大的困難。

　　Chinese officials will agree there is sometimes a balance to be struck. Beijing has signed up to United Nations principles on the rights of citizens as well as states. But it will only go so far. Thus, while it allowed UN authorisation for intervention in Libya, Mr Wen insists the western military action was a mistake not to be repeated elsewhere.

　　中國官員認(rèn)同一點，即有時需要取得某種平衡。中國政府已簽署了《聯(lián)合國公民權(quán)利和政治權(quán)利國際公約》，但也只會做到這一步了。因此，盡管它同意聯(lián)合國授權(quán)對利比亞進(jìn)行干預(yù)，但溫家寶仍堅稱，西方的軍事行動是一個錯誤，不應(yīng)在其它任何地區(qū)重演。

　　So far, so clear. It is when you ask about China’s ambitions for its place in the world that inscrutability sets in. Yes, China wants a role commensurate with its history as a great and ancient civilisation. Yes, its economic rise has greatly expanded its strategic interests. But does it want to shape a different international order? How far will it extend its military reach? Does it see its own political and economic model competing more widely with western liberal capitalism? These are questions that rarely elicit illuminating responses.

　　到此為止，情況已非常清楚。當(dāng)你問及中國對于其國際地位的雄心時，很難得到一個明朗的答案。是的，中國希望自己的地位與它偉大而古老的文明相配，其經(jīng)濟(jì)騰飛也大大擴(kuò)張了它的戰(zhàn)略利益。但它希望塑造一個新的國際秩序嗎？它將在多大程度上擴(kuò)張其軍事勢力范圍？它是否認(rèn)為自己的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)模式正在與西方自由資本主義展開更廣泛的競爭？這些問題很少引出有啟發(fā)性的回答。

　　Inference provides some of the answers. The activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea and the present tilt of military spending point to the desire to push back US forces. A close alliance with Pakistan underlines the strategic weight given to safeguarding China’s supply lines to and from the oil-rich Gulf.

　　部分問題可通過推斷得到答案。中國人民解放軍近來在南海的活動，以及目前軍費開支的加大，都表明中國渴望抵制美國的軍事力量。與巴基斯坦的緊密聯(lián)盟則突顯出，中國把保衛(wèi)本國與富產(chǎn)石油的海灣地區(qū)之間的雙向供應(yīng)線路視為戰(zhàn)略重點。

　　A strategy of divide and rule suggests a conscious desire to capitalise on Europe’s present weakness and undercut the Atlantic alliance. The more China rises, the wider will be the spread of its interests.

　　“分而治之”的戰(zhàn)略表明，中國有意識地希望利用歐洲目前的衰弱撈取好處，同時削弱大西洋聯(lián)盟。隨著中國一步步崛起，其利益范圍也會越來越廣。

　　How wide? China is not bidding to fill the role of global hegemon recently vacated by the US. There are too many natural constraints on its power – think geography, India and Japan as well as the US. Beyond that, we do not really know. But then nor, I suspect, does China.

　　中國的利益范圍到底會有多廣？中國并不打算接手美國不久前空出的全球霸主地位。中國的力量受到太多天然的限制——想一想它的地緣、印度、日本和美國吧。除此之外，我們也說不好到底會怎樣，不過，我懷疑中國自己也不清楚。