中國(guó)最近的罷工事件──特別是在廣東和珠三角的制成品出口中心──出乎多數(shù)觀察人士的意料。上海、北京及其周邊的用工短缺也不是個(gè)別現(xiàn)象。很多地方政府、特別是東部沿海發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)的地方政府今年已將最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提高了15%到20%.

　　由勞資糾紛造成的工資暴漲無疑會(huì)讓北京感到不安。但從長(zhǎng)期來看，中國(guó)的工資增長(zhǎng)應(yīng)當(dāng)反映其制造業(yè)生產(chǎn)率相當(dāng)高的增長(zhǎng)速度。工資加快增長(zhǎng)會(huì)給中國(guó)和世界其他地方帶來很大的好處。首先，中國(guó)的工資水平會(huì)進(jìn)一步接近更加成熟的工業(yè)國(guó)家，從而減輕抵制中國(guó)出口商品的保護(hù)主義壓力。其次，工資水平提高會(huì)扭轉(zhuǎn)勞動(dòng)力占中國(guó)國(guó)民收入份額的下降趨勢(shì)。減少企業(yè)利潤(rùn)所占的份額（過去幾年已變得過高）、提高家庭可支配收入，中國(guó)的消費(fèi)自然就會(huì)上去，貿(mào)易順差自然就會(huì)下來。

　　為讓工資增長(zhǎng)更加有跡可循，中國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期匯率政策應(yīng)該是怎樣的？世界上很多地方，特別是亞洲，其本幣匯率都以美元為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。中國(guó)的進(jìn)出口產(chǎn)品多以美元計(jì)價(jià)，國(guó)際資本流動(dòng)也是如此。中國(guó)凈儲(chǔ)蓄余額主要體現(xiàn)為流動(dòng)性美元債權(quán)的大量積累。在這個(gè)向美元看齊的世界，要鼓勵(lì)中國(guó)工資持續(xù)高增長(zhǎng)、與生產(chǎn)率增速相匹配，關(guān)鍵是確定完全可靠的人民幣兌美元固定匯率。

　　相比之下，強(qiáng)迫中國(guó)讓人民幣升值則會(huì)適得其反。如果中國(guó)雇主擔(dān)心人民幣匯率會(huì)在將來走高，它們就更不愿意在當(dāng)前承諾大幅增加工資。否則的話，如果出口企業(yè)允諾給出人民幣高工資過后發(fā)現(xiàn)人民幣匯率也已經(jīng)上升，以美元計(jì)算的實(shí)際工資增幅還要高出許多，那么它們就有可能面臨破產(chǎn)。在一個(gè)他國(guó)（包括美國(guó)）競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)品都用美元計(jì)價(jià)的世界，人民幣兌美元牢牢固定后，中國(guó)雇主就可以更加準(zhǔn)確地估計(jì)，什么樣的工資增幅才是和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率將來的預(yù)期增速相匹配的。要是哪一位雇主給的工資少了，其他企業(yè)就很有可能挖去他最寶貴的員工。

　　日本以前的經(jīng)驗(yàn)說明了日?qǐng)A兌美元匯率對(duì)于決定工資增速的重要性。在經(jīng)歷二戰(zhàn)過后的通脹亂局與經(jīng)濟(jì)失序之后，日本政府于1949年在美國(guó)的財(cái)務(wù)援助之下統(tǒng)一了混亂的匯率（拋棄多種匯率和支付限制），并將匯率中間價(jià)固定在360日?qǐng)A兌一美元的水平。在這種盯住美元的匯率制度下，日本上演戰(zhàn)后奇跡：從20世紀(jì)50年代早期到1971年，國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值和制造業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率開始以每年約9%的速度增長(zhǎng)，貨幣工資增長(zhǎng)速度達(dá)10%以上，超過美國(guó)的兩倍。在批發(fā)物價(jià)穩(wěn)定的情況下，貿(mào)易大致實(shí)現(xiàn)平衡，國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力也大致平衡。

　　但在1971年8月，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)尼克松（Richard Nixon）逼迫其他工業(yè)國(guó)家──日本、加拿大和西歐國(guó)家──對(duì)美元升值，震驚世界。尼克松對(duì)所有工業(yè)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品征收了一種關(guān)稅，直到其他工業(yè)國(guó)家同意本幣升值才予取消。在過后的12月份，所有這幾個(gè)工業(yè)國(guó)家都同意升值。日本升值17%.早至1970年，美元貶值預(yù)期就造成大量熱錢流出美國(guó)。外國(guó)央行為防止本幣升值超過同尼克松約定的幅度，通過買入美元進(jìn)行了重手干預(yù)。這樣導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果是70年代和80年代世界范圍內(nèi)的貨幣失控，大通脹，經(jīng)濟(jì)周期大起伏，以及經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)遲滯不前。

　　由于當(dāng)時(shí)日本已經(jīng)成為美國(guó)最大的工業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，美國(guó)開始錯(cuò)誤地逼迫日本強(qiáng)制實(shí)施日?qǐng)A的進(jìn)一步升值。1995年4月，日?qǐng)A從1971年8月份的360日?qǐng)A兌一美元升值到80日?qǐng)A兌一美元。熱錢流入開始在一定程度上造成日本80年代末的樓市和股市泡沫。但泡沫在1990年破滅后，加上估值過高的日?qǐng)A進(jìn)一步升值，日本經(jīng)濟(jì)跌入一輪通貨緊縮低迷期，至今尚未復(fù)元。到70年代末，貨幣工資增速已經(jīng)跌到低于美國(guó)的水平；而在2010年，日本的工資水平事實(shí)上還出現(xiàn)了下降。

　　中國(guó)應(yīng)當(dāng)從中吸取什么樣的教訓(xùn)？長(zhǎng)期來看，匯率升值和貨幣工資增長(zhǎng)是互為替代的。而無跡可循的匯率升值加上與之相關(guān)的熱錢流入，對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)損害還要大得多。最好是將匯率牢牢地固定在6.83元人民幣兌一美元的水平，就跟過去兩年一樣。然后溫和地向反對(duì)者解釋，北京充分尊重──甚至鼓勵(lì)──工人善意爭(zhēng)取加薪，以匹配制造業(yè)生產(chǎn)率的高增長(zhǎng)。

　　但美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)又在威脅，如果人民幣不升值，就會(huì)對(duì)來自中國(guó)的進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品征收懲罰性關(guān)稅。為控制貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義的政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，中國(guó)人民銀行在6月19日讓人民幣對(duì)美元脫鉤，并成功地──至少是暫時(shí)成功地──消解了美方的壓力。

　　但如果是系統(tǒng)地讓人民幣升值，或者是揚(yáng)言要進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)性的升值，熱錢馬上就會(huì)重新開始流入，并在更長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)減緩貨幣工資的增長(zhǎng)。另外，不連貫的大幅升值也不會(huì)化解局勢(shì)，因?yàn)樗惶赡芙档兔绹?guó)人如此關(guān)注的貿(mào)易順差（即凈儲(chǔ)蓄）。

　　在這種不必要的政治危機(jī)背后，是一種得到普遍認(rèn)可但實(shí)際不成立的經(jīng)濟(jì)信條：匯率可以用來控制任何國(guó)家的貿(mào)易余額，即該國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄與投資間的差額。相反，這種不平衡來自于美國(guó)的巨額存款缺口──巨大的財(cái)政赤字加上極低的個(gè)人儲(chǔ)蓄率──和中國(guó)因高額企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、政府收入而產(chǎn)生的“過剩”儲(chǔ)蓄。

　　不幸的是，華盛頓仍在進(jìn)行的人民幣匯率辯論不只是分散人們的注意力。事實(shí)上，威脅升值很有可能妨礙中國(guó)工資水平按制造業(yè)勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率增速而增加的自然過程，從而導(dǎo)致更大的勞資沖突，甚至是中國(guó)泡沫的日本式破滅。

　　Recent Chinese labor strikes —— particularly in the heartland of manufactured exports in Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta —— have taken most observers by surprise. Labor shortages in and around Shanghai and the Beijing area are also widespread. Many local governments，particularly on the developed eastern seaboard，have increased minimum wages by 15% to 20% this year.

　　A wage explosion fed by labor militancy is obviously disconcerting to Beijing. But in the long term China's wage increases should reflect its remarkably high productivity growth in manufacturing. Higher wage growth would have two great advantages for China and for the rest of the world. First，Chinese wages would become closer to those in the more mature industrial countries，thus reducing protectionist pressures against imports from China. Second，higher wage settlements would reverse labor's declining share in China's national income. With a shift away from business profits —— which have become exorbitantly high in the last several years —— to greater household disposable income，consumption would naturally rise and reduce China's trade surplus.

　　For wages to grow less erratically what should China's long-term exchange-rate policy be？Much of the world， particularly Asia，is on a dollar standard. Most Chinese exports and imports are invoiced in dollars，as are international financial flows. China's net saving surplus is manifested mainly in a huge buildup of liquid dollar claims. In this dollar-based world，a fully credible fix of the yuan/dollar rate is the key to encouraging sustained high growth in Chinese wages that matches productivity growth.

　　In contrast，bashing China to appreciate its currency is counterproductive. If Chinese employers fear that the yuan will be higher in the future，then they become more loath to grant large wage increases in the present. Otherwise，producers of export products could be bankrupted if they granted high wage claims in yuan only to find out afterward that the yuan had also ratcheted upward，making the effective wage increases much larger in dollar terms. In a world where competing goods from other countries （including the U.S.）are all invoiced in dollars，then a safely fixed yuan/dollar rate allows a Chinese employer to estimate more precisely what wage increases are commensurate with expected future growth in labor productivity. If any one employer offers less，others could well bid away his most prized workers.

　　The earlier experience of Japan shows the importance of the yen/dollar rate in determining wage growth. After the inflationary chaos and economic disorganization following World War II，in 1949 the Japanese government with American financial assistance unified the battered currency （got rid of multiple exchange rates and payments restrictions）and fixed the central rate at 360 yen per dollar. With this dollar anchor，the postwar Japanese miracle unfolded：From the early 1950s to 1971，GDP and labor productivity in manufacturing began to grow by about 9% per year while growth in money wages was in excess of 10%，which was more than twice as high as in the U.S. With stable wholesale prices，trade was roughly balanced and so was international competitiveness.

　　But in August 1971，President Richard Nixon shocked the world by forcing the other industrial countries —— Japan，Canada and those in Western Europe —— to appreciate against the dollar. Nixon imposed a tariff on all industrial imports until the other industrial countries agreed to appreciate，which they all did by the following December. Japan appreciated by 17%. As early as 1970，the expectation of dollar depreciation caused huge hot money flows out of the U.S. Foreign central banks intervened heavily to buy dollars to prevent their currencies from appreciating more than what was agreed to with Nixon. The result was a world-wide loss of monetary control，great inflation，large business cycle fluctuations，and slow economic growth in the 1970s into the '80s.

　　Because Japan had by then emerged as America's foremost industrial competitor，the U.S. mistakenly began 'bashing' Japan to force further yen appreciation. The yen rose to a high of 80 per dollar in April 1995 from 360 per dollar in August 1971. Hot money inflows first contributed to land- and stock-market bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s. But after these burst in 1990 and the overvalued yen rose even further，the economy was thrown into a deflationary slump from which it has yet to recover. By the end of the 1970s，money wage growth had slumped to less than in the U.S. —— and Japanese wages are actually falling in 2010.

　　What is the lesson for China here？Exchange rate appreciation and money wage growth are substitutes in the long term. But an erratically appreciating exchange rate with the associated hot money flows does much more long-term damage to the economy. Best to keep the exchange rate safely fixed near 6.83 yuan/dollar —— as it had been for two years. Then gently explain to would-be China bashers that Beijing fully respects —— and even encourages ——workers to bargain in good faith for higher wages to match high productivity growth in manufacturing.

　　Nevertheless，the U.S. Congress is again threatening to impose punitive tariffs on imports from China unless the yuan is appreciated. To contain the political risks from trade protectionism，the People's Bank of China depegged the yuan on June 19 and succeeded in defusing U.S. pressure —— at least temporarily.

　　But any systematic yuan appreciation —— or threat thereof —— will immediately restart the hot money inflows and，in the longer term，slow money wage growth. Moreover，any discrete sharp appreciation won't defuse the situation either because it would be unlikely to reduce China's trade （i.e.，net saving）surplus on which the Americans are so focused.

　　Behind this unnecessary political crisis is a widely held but false economic belief： the idea that the exchange rate can be used to control any country's trade balance —— the difference between its saving and investment. Instead， the imbalance arises from a large saving deficiency in the U.S. —— with very large fiscal deficits and low personal saving —— coupled with 'surplus' saving in China from high business profits and buoyant government revenue.

　　Unfortunately，the yuan/dollar debate that continues in Washington is more than a distraction. Indeed，the threat of appreciation may well impede the natural process by which Chinese wages rise as fast as labor productivity in manufacturing， leading to greater unrest and perhaps even a Japan-like bursting of a Chinese bubble.