Islamism has long been a thorn in relations between China and Pakistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan’s Islamists made a determined push to forge closer ties with Muslim separatists in China. They made overtures in the mainly Muslim western province of Xinjiang. Some even believed the creation of an Islamic republic in China was possible. The resulting diplomatic strain haunts policymakers on both sides.

　　長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，伊斯蘭主義一直是中國(guó)與巴基斯坦關(guān)系中的一根刺。1989年蘇聯(lián)撤出阿富汗后，巴基斯坦的伊斯蘭主義者決意要與中國(guó)的穆斯林分裂勢(shì)力建立緊密關(guān)系。他們?cè)谝阅滤沽秩丝跒橹鞯奈鞑渴》菪陆竞?。有些人甚至認(rèn)為，在中國(guó)創(chuàng)建一個(gè)伊斯蘭共和國(guó)是可能的。由此導(dǎo)致的外交緊張深深地困擾著雙方的政策制定者。

　　Today, Pakistan’s Islamists no longer flaunt ambitions to radicalise their Chinese co-religionists. Instead, they now see Beijing as a trusted friend. In the wider population, according to recent polls by Washington’s Pew Research Center, as many as three-quarters of those surveyed took a negative view of the US. The majority saw Pakistan’s biggest ally more as a foe than a friend, fearing it could become a military threat.

　　如今，巴基斯坦的伊斯蘭主義者不再夸耀要讓中國(guó)教友們變得激進(jìn)的雄心。相反，他們現(xiàn)在把北京方面視作可信賴的朋友。華盛頓皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)近期的調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，在更廣泛的民眾中，有多達(dá)四分之三的受訪者對(duì)美國(guó)持負(fù)面看法。對(duì)于巴基斯坦的這個(gè)最大盟友，大部分人更多的是把它視作敵人，而非朋友，擔(dān)心它可能成為一個(gè)軍事威脅。

　　"China’s friendship to Pakistan is an important guarantee for our stability," says Liaquat Baloch, a senior leader of Jamaat-e-Islami, a mainstream religious political party. “China relates to other countries without any agenda, where the US has an agenda which is all about interfering in the lives of others,” he says.

　　“中巴友誼是巴基斯坦穩(wěn)定的一個(gè)重要保障，”主流宗教性政黨“伊斯蘭大會(huì)黨”(Jamaat-e-Islami)的高級(jí)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人利雅卡特?巴洛奇(Liaquat Baloch)表示，“中國(guó)在與他國(guó)交往時(shí)沒(méi)有任何議程，而美國(guó)的外交議程盡是怎么干涉別國(guó)事務(wù)。”

　　Pakistan’s security officials say the armed forces in both countries, which now have strong ties, played a big hand in this turnround. The Pakistani army moved fast to block local Islamist militants from linking up with Uighur Muslim separatists. By contrast, it has nurtured militant groups threatening India and Afghanistan.

　　巴基斯坦的安全官員表示，中巴兩國(guó)軍隊(duì)對(duì)雙方外交關(guān)系的轉(zhuǎn)變起到了重要作用。兩國(guó)軍方如今聯(lián)系緊密。巴基斯坦軍隊(duì)在阻止本地伊斯蘭武裝分子與維吾爾族穆斯林分裂勢(shì)力建立聯(lián)系方面行動(dòng)迅速。與之形成對(duì)比的是，巴軍培育了威脅印度和阿富汗的武裝集團(tuán)。

　　"A decision was made early on which drew the line. [There would be] zero tolerance for anyone trying to destabilise China’s interests in Xinjiang," says one Pakistani security official.

　　“巴方早就做出決定，劃清了界線，絕不姑息任何企圖破壞中國(guó)在新疆利益穩(wěn)定的人，”一位巴基斯坦安全官員表示。

　　One of Beijing’s main preoccupations in Pakistan is watching Islamist groups that may yet pose a threat – particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Following riots in Xinjiang three years ago, Islamabad pledged its support for “breaking the back” of this separatist group, which is based in its territory.

　　中國(guó)在巴基斯坦最關(guān)切的事務(wù)之一，是監(jiān)控仍然可能構(gòu)成威脅的伊斯蘭組織，特別是“東突厥斯坦伊斯蘭運(yùn)動(dòng)”。3年前新疆發(fā)生騷亂后，巴基斯坦承諾為“摧毀”這個(gè)分裂組織提供支持。東突的大本營(yíng)就在巴基斯坦境內(nèi)。

　　"China still likes to keep an eye on those Islamic groups which it considers to be reckless," says Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former senior diplomat. “We have had some cases of attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan. But the positive development is the mindset among Islamists who now see the US as the main global threat.”

　　前高級(jí)外交官坦維爾·艾哈邁德汗(Tanvir Ahmad Khan)表示：“中國(guó)仍喜歡盯著那些在其看來(lái)行事不計(jì)后果的伊斯蘭組織。巴基斯坦發(fā)生過(guò)一些襲擊中國(guó)人事件，但形勢(shì)正在好轉(zhuǎn)，伊斯蘭主義者現(xiàn)在把美國(guó)視作主要的國(guó)際威脅。”